In developing a theory of the rst appropriation of natural resources from the state of nature John Locke tells us that persons must leave enough and as good for oth- 
Lockean appropriation makes people no worse o than they would be how? This question of xing the baseline needs more detailed investigation than we are able to give it here.
It would be desirable to have an estimate of the general economic importance of original appropriation in order to see how much leeway there is for diering theories of appropriation and of the location of the baseline.
-Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 177.
Introduction
John Locke begins chapter ve of the Second Treatise of Government with a puzzle: God gave to mankind the whole earth in common, yet individuals own things. How does this happen? To which Locke responds: persons acquire property by mixing their labor with those unowned resources in the state of nature: Whatsoever then he removes out of the state of nature that nature hath provided. . . he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property (Locke 1690 (Locke /1980 . by setting provisos or restrictions on his theory of appropriation. First, in the case of fruits and other things capable of spoilage, persons may take as much as anyone can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils. . . whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others (Locke 1690 (Locke /1980 . Second, in the case of land and natural resources (things not subject to spoilage), persons may appropriate so long as they leave enough and as good for others (Locke 1690 (Locke /1980 . Most think provisos of this general nature are essential for any theory of property. As Robert Nozick notes: . . . any adequate theory of justice in acquisition will contain a proviso. . . A process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened (Nozick 1974: 178).
Though essential, what exactly these provisos permit and make impermissible is not obvious. Again following Nozick, clearly these provisos are meant to ensure that the situation of others is not worsened (Nozick 1974: 175) . But as one of Nozick's greatest detractors reminds: Disagreement will come on what should here count as worsening another's situation (Cohen 1995: 75) . This disagreement has led to an extensive literature debating the best way of understanding these provisos though they all take Locke as their root inspiration, these dierent versions of the provisos result in radically dierent conclusions concerning what is prohibited and what is permitted when it comes to the rst appropriation of unowned resources from the state of nature. This paper joins the debate by examining two dierent ways of interpreting the second Lockean proviso, the one pertaining to natural resources (land in particular) and other things not subject to spoilage, requiring we leave enough and as good for others. More specically, the paper examines what we broadly call right libertarianism and left libertarianism. Briey, right libertarians interpret enough and as good as requiring no or very minimal restrictions on the rst appropriation of natural resources, and left libertarians interpret enough and as good as requiring everyone be entitled to an equal share of unappropriated resources, able to claim no more beyond this equal share. properties. We are thus mainly concerned with the consequences of implementing dierent restrictions on rst appropriation. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls reminds us that all ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness.
One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy (Rawls 1971: 30) . We agree, which is why we take the particular approach we do in this paper. Interestingly, though there has been signicant eort invested into formally modeling Thomas Hobbes's state of nature as articulated in his classic Leviathan (Gauthier 1969 1 Hopefully this paper not only helps adjudicate between the right versus left 1 One exception is a very recent working paper by Justin Bruner. However, Bruner formally models Locke's account of the causes of conict in the state of nature. Our paper is only interested in formally modeling Locke's theory of rst appropriation from the state of nature.
libertarian debate, but also inspires further employment of the tools of modern economics and political science to examine more closely Locke's state of nature and his theory of the social contract.
Using a standard general equilibrium framework taken from economic theory, we show that in the short term, a trade-o exists between leaving unowned land for future households that may be constrained in their ability to claim land in the rst period, and improving the quality of land available for production in future periods. Therefore, if the value of investment in land is high or persistence in inequality of ability is high thereby both raising the benets and lowering the costs of allowing unconstrained appropriation then the right libertarian proviso makes all types of households better o. We then proceed to show that in the long run, the right libertarian interpretation of the proviso is always Pareto dominant regardless the assumptions, so long as one adopts a long enough time horizon.
Strikingly, this holds even in a world in which all land is claimed by one household in the rst period, preventing households that would like to claim land in future periods from being able to do so, thereby making them initially worse o. Despite having fewer resources in the middle term, however, these households are eventually made better o by the eciency gains (in terms of more ecient production) brought about by improvements in land via early investment. Generically, we show that no feasible compensation regime can save the left libertarian proviso from these long-run results.
Though we initially set out focusing on the welfare properties of competing theories of rst appropriation, the model developed in this paper also sheds signicant insight on moral dimensions of the debate. In the literature there are two prominent justications for implementing a left libertarian scheme of property rights, one based on luck egalitarian considerations, and one based on Rawls's idea of maximizing the welfare of the least advantaged. Our model shows that so long as certain plausible, we believe assumptions hold, these two justications for left libertarianism actually lead one to endorse a right libertarian interpretation of the proviso, not a left libertarian one.
Interpreting the Lockean Proviso

Right Libertarianism
What we consider to be right libertarianism can be broken down into three distinct subgroups. First (i ) are those who are most radical, and simply deny that there is any proviso on the rst appropriation of natural resources at all. Second (ii ) are those who do believe that there should be some proviso restricting rst appropriation, but interpret this proviso such that the restrictions are quite lax: on our reading, this group sees relatively few instances of rst appropriation as impermissible. Sanders argues that we should abandon the Lockean proviso because it is self-defeating.
On Sanders's interpretation, (a ) the Lockean theory of property is meant to make society more industrious, yet (b) the proviso (and, particularly, more stringent interpretations of the proviso) does just the opposite. In his words: Abandoning the Lockean Proviso altogether would have the eect of making more resources available, as potential property, to the class of initial labor mixers. . . Since the whole point of the Proviso was to promote opportunity for acquiring property, it seems to be self-defeating (Sanders 1987: 382) .
The second (ii ) group contains those persons who do think rst appropriation should be subject to a proviso, but think that this proviso imposes very limited restrictions indeed.
Nozick is often thought to be in this category, though we read Nozick's discussion of the proviso to be rather speculative and non-committal. with left libertarian theories of rst appropriation that do allow for appropriation (contra group (i )), that also allow for this appropriation to be unilateral (contra group (ii )). It should be noted, however, that most contemporary left libertarians are in groups (iii ) and (iv ), allowing the model we develop to still be quite general.
In group (iii ) is the intellectual founder of contemporary left libertarianism, Steiner.
According to Steiner:
Initially unowned things must be justly ownable. But how? The evident answer is that our equal original property rights entitle us to equal bundles of these things. That is, we each have a vested liberty to mix our self-owned labour with only as many of these things as would, in Locke's famous phrase, leave enough and as good for others. And the correlative original duties vesting that liberty are ones not to appropriate more than this amount. We are each entitled to an equal share of (at least) raw natural resources. Mixing our labour with more than this share constitutes a relinquishment to our titles of that labour (Steiner 1994 : 235-236).
A literal reading of this passage suggests that one may appropriate one's equal share of natural resources and then no more. According to Vallentyne, Steiner, and Otsuka, though, one may permissibly appropriate more than an equal share of unowned resources, so long as one compensates those whose equal share one has appropriated from. At rst, our formal model does not address this possibility: each player is able to appropriate 1/n of the resources available, where n is the total number of players in the appropriation game. This, we take it, is the left libertarian's ideal state of aairs, and any post hoc redistribution that occurs when one takes more than one's fair share is a second-best adjustment to non-ideal instances of rst appropriation. We then extend the model, however, to include post hoc redistribution.
As we shall see, adding such compensation to a left libertarian scheme of rst appropriation does little to change the eciency properties when compared to left libertarianism without post hoc compensation, which is a noteworthy result in and of itself. Egalitarian proviso. You may acquire previously unowned worldly resources if and only if you leave enough so that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned worldly resources.
Otsuka is non-committal concerning what is meant by equally advantageous: The phrasè equally advantageous shares of unowned worldly resources' that I employ in the egalitarian proviso should be read as a term of art that is a neutral among a range of familiar welfarist and resource-based metrics of equality (Otsuka 2003: 25 ], and whether they invested in land this period I t i ∈ [0, 1], with a common discount rateβ ∈ (0, 1). The only assumptions we make concerning utility functions standard in the economic theory of general equilibrium are that these functions are quasiconcave for each consumption good (meaning that there exist diminishing marginal returns for each good), that the two consumption goods are complements (meaning that the marginal return on one good is increasing in the amount one consumes of the other, so that one wants both of these goods), and that utility of leisure and not investing in land is linear and independent of consumption (meaning that consuming goods does not add to the utility of leisure, and that consuming goods does not take away from the disutility of labor).
Specically, the utility function for each household can be written in the form:
where ω > 0 and c t i ≥ 0.
Households can work land to produce either of the two consumption goods. The production functions for each good (in terms of the land and labor required to produce this good) are as follows:
where γ > 1 andt is the number of periods in which the land has been invested. Notice
here that the more periods the land has been invested in the less labor it takes to produce good y, though this is not so for good x: the rate of production for x remains constant regardless how much the land has been invested in. Therefore, we can think of x as a simple, natural consumption good (e.g., apples) that must only be harvested, while y is a good which is more amenable to structured production, and therefore mechanization (e.g., advanced agriculture). Thus, the more a parcel of land has been invested in say, the more advanced one's agricultural system is the more of consumption good y can be produced for the same amount of labor when compared to a parcel of land that has been invested in less. Intuitively, think here of how much labor it requires to produce a bushel of wheat on a primitive farm in a typical third world country when compared to the amount of labor it requires to produce that same bushel of wheat on a farm in Iowa.
The only dierence between the two households concerns their ability to invest in land.
In the rst period, one household, A, will have cost function c 1 A = 0 and will therefore bear no cost from investing in land. The other household, B, has a cost of investment c 1 B =c, where c is suciently large such that B will never invest in the land.
2 Thus, one household faces a low cost of investment, either because of easier resource accessibility, sheer ability, or other forms of luck and opportunity. The other household faces an unbearably high cost of investment.
We can refer to these states as low-investment and high-investment respectively. We make this assumption because, if there is no dierence in ability to invest among households in the state of nature, then there will be no dierence between the right and left interpretations 2 An alternative interpretation of this assumption is that B is a household which is not born until the second period, and hence cannot appropriate land in the rst period, for B simply has not been born yet. Therefore, the model as presented also embeds a model with population growth.
of the Lockean proviso in terms of their eciency properties. Note, though, that assuming there are dierences in ability to invest in land between the two households does not imply that these dierences supervene on the innate ability or capacity of these households. The reason whyA has low investment costs in the rst period might be because this household has physical access to fertile, green pastures, whereas the reason whyB has high investment costs in the rst period might be because the land this household has physical access to is quite rocky and of general poor quality, making it dicult to invest in.
Though household A begins with low costs of investment and household B begins with high costs of investment these cost functions can vary over time. While one generation of a household may possess better opportunities or ability, there is no guarantee that the relative fortunes of the next generation will be the same such is the way of the world. Given that a household i is the high-investment type in period t, they will remain the high-investment type in period t+1 with probability p. They will become the low-investment type (with household j becoming the high-investment type) with corresponding probability 1 − p. Therefore, we can think of p as persistence in terms of place within the distribution of opportunities, and 1 − p as mobility in terms of place within the distribution of opportunities. The revelation of the next period's skill distribution occurs just before consumption in the previous period.
Once the next period's skill distribution has been revealed, the households, using wealth acquired from wages and land, can purchase either of the two goods and/or land for the next period. These will be sold at market prices in a standard general equilibrium framework, as neither party is a monopsony buyer nor a monopoly seller. 
Land
In the state of nature there exists an (initially unowned) unit interval of land. In keeping with any (standard) interpretation of the Lockean proviso, we will assume that the act of mixing one's labor with some portion of land L as investment confers a property right in that land. The household i which appropriated the land will have control rights over that portion of land going forward. From that period onward, the household that owns the land will be able to decide what is done with any goods produced from the land, as well as have the ability to transfer control rights both as present-day rentals, and in future periods.
Of course, working the land for the purpose of further production inherently removes the ability of the general population to work that land and reap its returns. The key dierence between competing interpretations of the Lockean proviso is precisely in how households can appropriate initially unowned land for their own purposes, as discussed above: .
Both parties have full control rights over the goods that are produced from the land appropriated. There can be trade between the parties, which occurs at the culmination of each period. Control rights can also be transferred for future periods, such that land that was held by household i in period t will be owned by j in period t + 1.
It is important to note here that the unit interval of land L is initially unowned by both parties neither household has any property rights at all at the beginning of the rst period.
This is important for, as the Coase theorem shows us, if there are no transaction costs then regardless the initial allocation of property rights, all ineciencies will be bargained away and an ecient outcome reached (Coase 1960 ). Thus, if right and left libertarian interpretations of the proviso were about how property rights are initially allocated rather than about how one acquires property rights in the rst place then there would be no dierence between the two in terms of their eciency properties (so long as we assume no transaction costs).
But this is not what right and left libertarian interpretations of the proviso are about. The debate is not about what the initial allocation of property rights should be, but rather about
how we come to the initial allocation of property rights in the rst place. As such, at the beginning of the rst period there is nothing for the parties to bargain with.
To sum up, the timing of each period t is as follows:
1. Any unowned land may be claimed (as allowed by the relevant version of the proviso) via investment, and any owned land may also feature further investment.
2. {c t+1 i } i=A,B is revealed.
3. Goods are produced using land and labor.
4. Trade of x, y, and L t+1 occurs in a general equilibrium framework.
As betting the stationary nature of the state variable (which household is high ability, A or B) across time, the equilibrium concept across periods is Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), while the equilibrium concept within periods will be the standard Walrasian equilibrium.
Therefore, we will focus on strategies that map only from the state variables (the structure of land ownership, the level of previous investment´γt∂L, the ability of households to invest in the current period {c t i } i=A,B , and the ability of the households to invest in the next period {c t+1 i } i=A,B ) onto strategies (investment decisions and general equilibrium production and trade).
Analysis
Preliminaries
An initial observation between the two diering versions of the Lockean proviso which follows directly from denitions is that more land will be claimed within the rst period given the RLP when compared to the LLP. In particular, there is no reason for A to leave any land unowned in the rst period under the RLP, as it simply restricts their ability to sell the land for rents in the future.
Observation 1: All land will be claimed in period 1 by A under the RLP. of the land will be claimed by A under the LLP.
This is a direct implication of c 1 A = 0. Unconstrained, the household which faces lower investment costs will claim the land which is too costly to acquire by the other household.
Hence, when the investment costs of one household are non-existent (which is by assumption true in the rst period for A), they will claim everything that is left behind by the household facing high investment costs.
A corollary of this is that the RLP will maximize the amount of total investment over time. This will have a direct impact upon total production and thus total utility (that is, the sum of utility for both A and B), as well as the utility of household A in particular:
Proposition 1: The RLP, when compared to the LLP, will maximize total investment, total production, and the utility of A.
One argument made by economists for something resembling the RLP is that it is the growth-maximizing interpretation of the proviso. As investment increases, the labor required to produce a unit of good y goes down. Hence, even if labor remains xed, total production still increases. This is not dissimilar to the standard argument for private property rights in general: by incentivizing investment, allowing private ownership of property will maximize the total production of utility in society.
4
Proposition 1 does not tell us, however, whether B is made better o given the increased investment under the RLP when compared to the LLP . In particular, since B is unable to claim land in the rst period due to the costs of investment, it is not ex ante obvious that B will be able to take advantage of this additional investment carried out by household A which occurs under the RLP . To actually consider the richer utility implications, one must analyze the equilibrium outcomes under both interpretations of the proviso. We begin by noting the relationship between investment in land, the wages in period t (w t ), and the prices of our two consumption goods in period t (p t x and p t y ). 4 For an overview see Acemoglu (2009 Proposition 2 says the more investment that has occurred the less labor will cost and the less our two consumption goods will cost. This arises due to investment reducing the price of consumable good y. As a result, the marginal cost of one unit of y falls, which lowers the wage necessary to hire workers, further reducing the price of both goods. Note that this does not mean that more investment intrinsically makes household B better o. If B owns no land, B will still get the same utility (due to the lower wage) even though goods x and y are cheaper.
To examine more carefully B's welfare under the RLP compared to the LLP we need to understand how these wage and price dynamics highlighted in the previous result impact the allocation of land.
Proposition 3: Let c t+1 i
=0 and c
What Proposition 3 tells us is that the household that expects to gain more from investment in the next period will end up with a greater share of the total land than the other household in that period. This is because, while both households value the land equally for its rental value (i.e., the ability to earn prots by using the land to produce goods), the household with low investment costs will be able to get an even larger market return on the land in period t + 1 due to increased productivity.
Two Periods
We are now in a position to compare B's welfare under the RLP and LLP .We do this rst for a game lasting strictly two periods in the current subsection. The next subsection extends this analysis to an indenite number of periods. In the two-period case, we can examine equilibrium outcomes by backwards induction. We do so by considering two possible cases: rst, the case in which B remains constrained in its ability to appropriate land in the second terminal period (c 2 B = c). And second, the case in which B is now the household with low costs of investment in the second terminal period (c 2 B = 0).
Consider when c 2 B = c. Here, B will again be unable to invest in the second period. By Proposition 2, we know that the prices and wages will be lower under the RLP. However, since wages move stepwise with prices, these eects will net out and have no impact upon B's total utility. Therefore, the real wage (in utility terms) for B will be the same.
The only change between the two periods comes in the form of available land and, particularly, the quality of this available land. By Proposition 1, the land available for B to purchase under the RLP at the end of rst period will be of higher marginal value than the land which was available in the rst period because it has been invested in. An alternative way to think about this is that the eective price of land will be lower under the RLP.
This means that B can only be made better o under the RLP when compared to the LLP . If B buys no land under either regime, B will have the same utility under both.
However, if B buys land under the RLP (where the eective price is lower), B will get a greater return in terms of production capacity when compared to the LLP . Therefore, households that stay perpetually poor can only be made better o by letting A claim (and invest in) all the land in the rst period. That is, B will be better o under the RLP when compared to the LLP when c 2 B = c. Here is what we can conclude from Theorem 1. When investment quality γ is high, the benet of greater investment in the rst period is higher. Therefore, the RLP becomes a relatively more ecient regime regardless B's ability to appropriate land in the second period. In addition, when persistence p is high (i.e., mobility is low), the LLP's benet (greater equality in ability to acquire land) will never obtain. Therefore, it is better for the low-investment household to simply allow A to claim all the land in the rst period and improve it: when households face larger and more permanent dierences in natural ability, it is actually better to have a land appropriation regime which exploits these dierences, rather than one that attempts to impose a form of equality that likely will never be helpful for either household, but particularly the less-advantaged household.
Long Run
We now examine how the welfare evaluations dier when extending the life of the households to several generations (i.e., T > 2). This is necessary when examining initial property acquisition, for we need to understand the long-run implications of initial acquisition over several generations, not just two time periods as the last section examined.
Begin by noting that until all land is owned, we know by the preceding section that everyone is made (weakly) better o under the RLP when compared to the LLP, as the additional land would never be used under the latter interpretation of the proviso. In addition, if in some periodt, B becomes the high-investment type, in all future periodst + 1 and forward, all land will be owned and traded under both the RLP and LLP . The only dierence between the RLP and the LLP at periodt+n will be the eective quality of the land. By Proposition 1, there will have been less investment under the LLP than the RLP. There will thus be higher-quality land under the RLP from this point forward. Since this reduces the price of labor and both our consumption goods, both households will be made better o from periodt + 1 forward under the RLP .
Theorem 2: There exists aT < ∞ such that if T >T , the RLP will make both households better o in T when compared to the LLP .T is decreasing in all the same variables as in Theorem 1.
That is, given a long enough time horizon, even B will be made better o given the RLP when compared to the LLP. So long as there are enough future periods to take advantage of the additional investment that occurs under the RLP , then even B will see a rise in utility when compared to how B fares under the LLP . The comparative statics are the same as with Theorem 1, as they are driven by the determinants of the price of land, and the benets of additional investment.
Compensation
Thus far our interpretation of the left libertarian proviso (the LLP) says that households may claim 1/n of the available land, where n is the number of players in the appropriation game. This, clearly, is the ideal articulated by what we called group (iii ) in section 2.2 above.
But we also noted in section 2.2 above that those in group (iii ) allow for appropriators to take more than their 1/n share so long as they compensate others for doing so. We now enrich our model by redening the left libertarian proviso to account for this, for it is at least intuitively plausible that permitting greater appropriation under the left libertarian proviso but then requiring transfers by those who took more than their fair share will allow the left libertarian proviso to better approximate the desirable welfare properties of the right libertarian proviso. for free. For all land claimed above 1 2 , household i must pay a ow transfer τ to the other household j.
Though it might prima facie seem that this will make a dierence in terms of left libertarianism's welfare properties, our model shows that this is not the case.
Corollary 1: There exists aT < ∞ such that if T >T , the RLP will make both actors suciently better o relative to LLP*.T is decreasing in all the same variables as in Theorem 1.
The intuition behind Corollary 1 ows directly from our Theorem 2 above. Begin by noting that for any τ > 0, A will not invest in all of the land within the rst period, as A does in the RLP. As a result of this, given a long enough time horizon, the eciency gains from early investment in land will eventually outweigh the temporary transfer gain in the rst period by B under the LLP*, just as it outweighs B's gain in the middle period under the standard interpretation of the LLP . The logic behind the result is thus exactly the same as Theorem 2: gains from early investment eventually pay o in a general equilibrium framework, which suggests that the earlier investment occurs, the better. Since forcing A to pay a transfer to B if A takes more than 1 2 of the available land under the LLP* has the eect of incentivizing A to not claim all of the available land as A does under the RLP, the result is the same.
Possible Extensions
Note that the model can be extended to include a more realistic examination of economies emerging out of the state of nature. There are extensions that would improve the relative performance of the LLP. For example, if there existed transaction costs for trade, or monopolistic advantages in the market for land, then the RLP's advantages of further initial investment in land will dissipate. However, as long as these do not become so large as to prevent all protable trade, the main results will still hold and there will still exist a sufciently long time horizon such that the RLP better maximizes the welfare of all parties when compared to the LLP. In addition, many such extensions will actually make the wedge between the RLP and LLP greater. For example, adding interior costs of investment (i.e., making c not rule out all investment and/or setting c 1 A > 0) limits the ability of A to take everything in the rst period.
Similarly, if there were greater degrees of specialization (i.e., in the ability to produce either of the two goods) or savings markets between the two periods, this would provide greater general equilibrium benets to household B from A's initial investment. Therefore, it is possible that our model actually understates the welfare benets of the RLP. or possibly some underlying moral principle such as the non-aggression principle (Rothbard 1998 ). These underlying normative commitments entail structuring property rights in a specic way, of which one component is a very minimal reading of enough and as good.
When it comes to left libertarians, most are usually committed to equal ownership of natural resources via some form of luck egalitarianism. Roughly, luck egalitarianism holds that an unequal distribution whose inequality cannot be vindicated by some choice or fault or desert on the part of (some of ) the relevant aected agents is unfair, and therefore, pro tanto unjust (Cohen 2008: 7) . That is, luck egalitarianism holds that deviations from perfect equality are only justied if the deviations are the result of non-arbitrary factors about the aected parties. Putting the two together, many left libertarians endorse equal ownership of natural resources because they believe it is the scheme of property that mitigates unequal distributions arising from undeserved dierences: it prevents people, for example, from owning more than others simply because they were there rst, which is an arbitrary fact about the aected parties indeed. In the words of Steiner: Left libertarianism is a luck egalitarian theory, or, more precisely, a family of luck egalitarian theories (Steiner 2011: 110). also shows that left libertarianism results in less inequality when compared to right libertarianism. Thus, left libertarianism can be seen as something of a second-best institutional arrangement for luck egalitarianism: though it does not eliminate arbitrary inequalities it certainly minimizes them, at least when compared to right libertarianism.
The above may, but not necessarily, be true. As we saw with clarity in the two-stage analysis in 4.3, if there is high persistence in dierences in ability (low mobility), then there may be less inequality under right libertarianism, as the high-investment type creates more net resources and provides more high-quality land for the low-ability type to make use of.
Therefore, if we believe there is stickiness in those inequalities which must be attributed to luck, left libertarianism may actually make the problem worse. This suggests that the luck egalitarian, when certain reasonable assumptions hold concerning persistence in dierences in ability, should actually endorse a right libertarian interpretation of the proviso to minimize the distributional consequences of such brute luck.
But suppose for the sake of argument that left libertarianism always unambiguously minimized distributional inequalities when compared to right libertarianism which, we have just seen, will only be true when certain assumptions hold. Still, our model creates a dilemma for those luck egalitarians who wish to embrace left libertarianism under such a presumption. Note that we cannot necessarily conclude that the right libertarian proviso does maximize the welfare of the least advantaged, thus satisfying the dierence principle. Any claim to Pareto optimality is always contingent on the alternatives one is comparing the putative optimal state to. If the relevant comparisons were just the left libertarian proviso and the right libertarian proviso then the right libertarian proviso would satisfy the dierence principle for, when compared to the one alternative, it does maximize the welfare of the least advantaged. But there could be a third proviso we have not considered that has yet to be articulated that makes those worst o better o when compared to the right libertarian proviso. Indeed, it might be that, given the relevant alternatives, right libertarianism is not even Pareto optimal, let alone the unique point on the Pareto frontier that maximizes the welfare of those worst o. But still, we can conclude that the dierence principle does not entail the left libertarian proviso, so long as right libertarianism is one of the eligible provisos to implement.
Here, one might object: there is no need for justice as reciprocity to embrace the dierence principle and only the dierence principle. Perhaps justice as reciprocity can endorse a dierent distributive principle of justice that is able to justify left libertarian schemes of property ownership over right libertarian schemes. Indeed, Quong himself asserts that he deliberately leaves the specic content of this principle undened when he argues for justice as reciprocity broadly construed to replace luck egalitarianism as the foundation of left libertarianism (Quong 2011: 81) .
In response, since the idea of justice as reciprocity includes the idea of mutual advantage, any plausible interpretation of justice as reciprocity will require, at the very least, a Pareto ecient distribution: if all parties could be made better o, the idea of mutual advantage requires that such gains are exhausted. But note, our model shows that right libertarianism does Pareto dominate left libertarianism as it is better for both the high-ability type (A) and low-ability type (B ), as shown by our two theorems so long as certain plausible assumptions hold. So long as justice as reciprocity includes the idea of mutual advantage, and so long as mutual advantage requires we take Pareto gains when they are available, then even rejecting the dierence principle as the most plausible interpretation of justice as reciprocity fails to save the left libertarian. Again, this does not imply that all versions of justice as reciprocity imply the right libertarian proviso because we do not know what the relevant comparison class should be. But we do know that, so long as the right libertarian proviso is one of the relevant options, then any version of justice as reciprocity will not entail the left libertarian proviso.
Conclusion
This paper approached the debate over dierent interpretations of the Lockean proviso through a new theoretical lens, by examining the welfare properties of dierent interpretations of the proviso. Our formal model produced an interesting result: right libertarian interpretations of the proviso will be better for both the naturally advantaged and naturally disadvantaged, given plausible empirical assumptions. Though we set out focusing exclusively on economic dimensions, our model also shed major insight on moral dimensions of the right versus left libertarian debate as well. Namely, it showed rst that luck egalitarianism can either not ground left libertarian conceptions of property, or, if it does, then one must accept the leveling down objection. Further, it also showed that new attempts at giving Rawlsian foundations to left libertarianism actually lead to the opposite result: justice as reciprocity requires we endorse a right libertarian interpretation of the Lockean proviso, not left. Given these two implications of our model, it is not clear where left libertarians turn so that they may provide coherent foundations to their favored account of property.
